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Exum: “No One Who Understands COIN Really Wants to Do It”
Matthew Yglesias — ... on the new memoir from COIN guru David Kilcullen I paid attention. But even more interesting than Bacevich’s take on Kilcullen was CNAS fellow and counterinsurgent Andrew Exum’s take on Bacevich’s take on Kilcullen: ...

Wonk Decency
The American Scene — ... I understand why critics of Bush-era interventionism, the military-industrial complex, etc. might be skeptical that anyone engaging specifically in “defense policy” would be altruistic in their motivations, as opposed to “foreign policy” specialists or other breeds of wonk. But sometimes it gets oddly paranoid. So when Andrew Exum sums up counterinsurgency theory in a sentence (though you should read the whole post) by saying “No one who really understands COIN wants to do it,” Matt Yglesias ...

COIN From The Inside
The Daily Dish | By Andrew Sullivan — ... sought to implement now gone from office, Kilcullen uses Accidental Guerrilla to skewer those he served for gross strategic ineptitude. His chief finding—that through its actions the Bush administration has managed to exacerbate the Islamist threat while wasting resources on a prodigious scale—is not exactly novel. Yet given Kilcullen’s status as both witness and participant, his indictment carries considerable weight. Here lies the real value of his book. (hat tip: Andrew Exum) ...

The Bush Doctrine: DOA at DOD? Part II
Obsidian Wings — ... of the Surge - and be overly influenced by the many practitioners filling out the ranks in the Pentagon.  One of CNAS's experts, David Kilcullen (whose work I admire), recently wrote a book entitled The Accidental Guerilla, which wasn't treated very kindly in a reviewby Andrew Bacevich.  Reacting to Bacevich's review, Andrew Exum (another CNAS expert and proprietor of the Abu Muquwama blog - whose work I also admire) had this to say: One of the things I have always maintained is that realists of ...

Countering the COIN Fad
democracyarsenal.org — ... This is exactly right. I would in particular hammer on the last point that raises the issue of military strategy versus tactics. A line you hear quite often from COIN advocates is that counter insurgency is difficult and we shouldn't do it - but the military has a responsibility to be ready to apply COIN strategy if our elected leaders demand it.  But of course the veneration of COIN goes beyond this rather minimal application. Many seem to view COIN as the future of war and based on the "success" of COIN in Iraq, they seem to believe that the United States is ...

War, What Is It Good For?
democracyarsenal.org — ... much energy to preparing our military to fight counter-insurgency, COIN advocates should be patiently explaining all the many reason why we should avoid them at all costs. But they're not. They are orienting army doctrine and key resources toward COIN. They are making it the key approach of our fight in Afghanistan. It's only a matter of time before they convince policymakers (and it may have already happened) that we're so good at COIN we should be doing more not less. If more people agreed that counterinsurgency is "hard" and it's "best to avoid it" why do ...