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War and Piece — ... that he shift U.S. strategy in Afghanistan to focus on ensuring regional stability and eliminating Taliban and al-Qaida safe havens in Pakistan, rather than on achieving lasting democracy and a thriving Afghan economy, officials said. The recommendations to narrow U.S. goals are contained in a classified report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that is likely to be shown soon to Obama as part of a review of Afghanistan strategy announced by the new administration. Some inspiration from this (. ...
The Audacity of Mendacity
Antiwar.com Original —
... the American Way is not yet won:"You do not see that yet in Afghanistan. They've got elections coming up, but effectively the national government seems very detached from what's going on in the surrounding community." How this is different from any other central government in Afghan history the president does not venture to say. Does he think he's dealing with, say, France? Afghanistan's very geography makes it ungovernable, despite what you may hear from those geniuses over at the Center for a New American Security or whatever neoconnish name they've dreamed up for the ...
The Bush Doctrine: DOA at DOD? Part II
Obsidian Wings —
... , I'd like to believe this but can't quite commit. While Exum is right that liberal interventionalists and neo-conservatives are more enthusiastic about the use of the military option, I'm not as certain that COIN practitioners are really all that reluctant in some settings. For example, it seems that many of those same practitioners that claim not to want to practice COIN are in favor of applying COIN in the Afghan theater over the next 5-10 years in order to accomplish the following modest goals: create a stable Afghanistan, ...
This Is My Mistake, Let Me Make it Good
Obsidian Wings —
... And yet, one of the primary objectives outlined by the highly influential CNAS think tank (whose members are being sucked up into the Obama administration with some rapidity) - one of the pillars of the proposed troop buildup in Afghanistan which that group advises should last 5-10 years - is the elimination of safe havens in Pakistan. In other words, large scale, time-intensive interference in Pakistan's fraught and unstable internal politics in pursuit of an exceedingly difficult aim. On the plus side, it promises to be an enormously expensive enterprise at a time when our ...
My Occupation's Known, but Not Why I Occupy
Obsidian Wings —
... For example, in that earlier post, I linked to a CNAS report written by four of the leading COIN scholars arguing why a 5-10 year military/diplomatic commitment in Afghanistan was necessary. It wasn't about operational doctrine - it was a strategic argument for maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan and warning of the outcomes if their plan is not followed. ...
My Occupation's Known, but Not Why I Occupy
Newshoggers.com —
... For example, in that earlier post, I linked to a CNAS report written by four of the leading COIN scholars arguing why a 5-10 year military/diplomatic commitment in Afghanistan was necessary. It wasn't about operational doctrine - it was a strategic argument for maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan and warning of the outcomes if their plan is not followed. ...
Ashes to Ashes, Funk to Funky
Obsidian Wings —
... For example, some leading foreign policy experts at the CNAS think tank have compiled a rather ambitious set of policy goals that include putting a halt to the opium trade, eradicating safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and building up Afghan (and Pakistani) state institutions. As David Kilcullen ...
Comparing Afghanistan and Iraq
PoliGazette —
... For example, some leading foreign policy experts at the CNAS think tank have compiled a rather ambitious set of policy goals that include putting a halt to the opium trade, eradicating safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and building up Afghan (and Pakistani) state institutions. As David Kilcullen ...
The Trouble with Counter-Insurgency Redux
democracyarsenal.org —
... this sort of military doctrine is simply not politically viable, why then were COIN advocates pushing for a rather fulsome and ambitious counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan? This wasn't a case of having "best practices handy" it was a case of advocating for what Exum calls a doctrine and making it the strategic foundation for our continued involvement in Afghanistan. Andrew says that my problem is with policy not military doctrine; and to some extent he is correct - I want our civilian leadership to fundamentally reassess the threats we are facing and think ...
We Chiseled and We Switched
Obsidian Wings —
... Those limitations are real. Even the Afghan optimists (the COIN experts that think that we must "succeed," and that we have a shot at succeeding) think that our only hope is to commit tens of thousands more troops for at least the next decade at a price tag (when combined with non-military outlays) in the neighborhood of several trillions of dollars. Oh, and even then we'll only succeed if we also eradicate the poppy crop and reorder Pakistan's society while we're creating a stable Afghanistan. ...
